TCS: Tech Central Station - War in Pieces: The Blood Feud

TCS: Tech Central Station - War in Pieces: The Blood Feud">This article suggests that the Global War on Terror should be retitled something like the Global Blood Feud with Terror. If you study the economics of war, this tactic makes some sense. The goal in a partisan or guerilla war is to keep the cost of each attack high enough to get attention but not so high that the victim society wishes to fight back. But can it be a blood feud with just one side acting consistent with the blood-feud model?

What are the economics to each side? So if a terrorist attack against the American population or the London population a few million to clean up and investigate, that makes no sense to START a trillion dollar hunt internationally. It is more economically efficient for the Americans or Brits to ramp up efforts a bit for political gain or at least political-loss prevention.

That is where the attack on the US on 9/11 changes the economic equation. America lost billions from those attacks. The world economy lost trillions. Now it is more economically efficient to seek out terrorists and break the back of terror supporters of Saddam and Iran. The fear of having multiple WTO-type attacks makes taking the war to the terrorists much more efficient then allowing the world economy to collapse in fear of WTO attacks.

The attack in Madrid and London falls back into the more economically efficient attacks on the West. These attacks cost very little to produce and cost the victim societies far less in economic loss, particularly costs directly attributable to the attack. The insurers paying to repair building facades will be small. The cost of life insurance carriers will be in the millions, but probably not much over $100 million, if I had to guess without any evidence -- which I do. London's economy (and therefore largely Great Britain's economy) lost a day of valuable production. Unfortunately, this may not be enough to mean much in long-term political will for Brits.

The WTO collapses cost insurers billions in real estate casualty coverage -- about $4 billion, I believe. The American Congress paid out about $1 million per victim in after-the-fact life insurance amounting to over $2 billion. Business losses were nationwide as the aircraft landed and people waited several days for the next attack. Fear of air travel continued for over a year.

Since then we attacked the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and more than decimated (note: decimate means "deci-" tenth + "mate" to kill; the Romans would punish a poor performing by killing every tenth legionnaire standing in formation) those organizations' leadership and membership. According to President Bush, we have killed far more than a tenth of those organizations leadership.

The blood-feud model is fitting for a terrorist organization like Al-Qaeda using modified guerilla tactics. American Revolutionary War General Francis "Swamp Fox" Marion won in South Carolina using guerilla tactics. The difference between American guerilla tactics and Al-Queda's terror tactics is the target. General Marion targeted the Red Coats, i.e., British soldiers in uniform. Al-Qaeda targets innocent civilians at home.

The classic examples of blood feuds are the Hatfields & McCoys and the Sicilian vendettas. Each had small, surprise attacks because of individuals being members of particular groups or individuals having committed previous "crimes" against the attacker.

While the blood feud model seems to describe Al Qaeda's current and most effective tactics, the same cannot be said of the Western response. Unlike a blood feud, the Western Powers are not reacting in a blood feud approach. This is where the blood feud model fails. In blood feuds there is no attempt to avoid collateral damage, reconstruct societies, spread democracy, build economies, or withdrawal from conquered lands.

So can this one-way blood-feud model work? Al Qaeda and its sympathizers have a huge problem in their military theory. Traditionally guerilla tactics are used by small forces not interested in holding territory to cause occupying forces to withdraw or to cause the government forces to loose credibility in the eyes of the public. General Marion did this well. He made the British occupation of South Carolina prohibitively expensive to maintain. This had the effect of building the American patriots at home believe that Independence could be accomplished. It pointed out the weakness of British control being projected across the Atlantic from London.

Mao Zedong converted these methods against military targets to civilian targets to undermine all sorts of governments in different countries to look shaky. Mao's approach was used by General Giap in Vietnam against the American forces. These guerilla tactics are mostly designed to create a political result. John Kerry's testimony to Congress in 1971 is what these tactics sought to accomplish.

Al Qaeda's attacks on the US, Spain, and Great Britain fail to achieve strategic goals that Mao and Giap demonstrated can work. These were indigenous efforts to cause political wills to change among the indigenous population. Al Qaeda's attacks are not indigenous.

Terroristic attacks tends to cause a rally around the flag. The duration of the rally depends on the effect on the pocketbook of citizens.

In the American sense, the rally has waned since 9/11. However, recruiting to the Army's infantry has never waned. The Army's recent recruiting difficulties are in the support positions. Who wants to go to Iraq to provide support to the infantry but get shot at? Americans want to carry guns and shoot. Passing guns up to the front is not nearly as inviting.

What does Al Qaeda strategically envision accomplishing? If this is jihad for conquest, do they really expect the US to collapse and submit to Islam or accept dhimmi status to an Islamic government? How do terror attacks lead to this goal? The logic of this strategy has failed. "Blackhawk Down" as the evidence of American suseptibility to accepting dhimmi status is a dubious source.

Al Qaeda seems to think that the West is as suseptible to spiritual collapse like Vietnam and Mogadishu just like Constantinople collapsed to the Turks. The story goes that the Eastern Roman Empire's (i.e., Byzantine Empire's) Senate debated meaningless theologic issues while the Turks were knocking at the gates of Constantinople. Al Qaeda seems to perceive all of the West through this six hundred year old prism.

Blood feuds have little strategic vision. Blood feuds usually are mirror-image affairs: each sides strategic goals are mostly about vengence and not about larger issues. Al Qaeda's understanding of the West seems to suggest blood feud should work. In the short term, we can see that it is not growing stronger. What about in the long term?

The West wants immediate, clear results. If that is not possible, our basic attitude is not to start. Much of Europe has chosen not to start on several fronts. While Bush and the Republicans remain in power and Blair remains Prime Minister, we have not only started but can see clear to continue. Our problem is that Blair and Bush will be leaving soon. Gordon Brown in Great Britain is not likely to be as strong. Who follows Bush?

This fall Germany's Schroeder may be leaving. Will Germany step up? The Dutch are still reeling from the murder of a director by an Islamicist.

The West's focus after 2008 is not clear. If the next round of Western leaders stay focused, Al Qaeda may be sunk. That will get us between 5-10 more years of focus. That may not solve the problem, but it will make it very difficult for the West to change when the out-of-power parties do come into power as Al Qaeda wishes we would.

What happens if an anti-Bush Democrat takes power with a Democratic Congress (both Senate and House)? Showing signs of change will re-invigorate the Blackhawk Down as the model. If a strong Democrat comes to power with Democratic Congressional support? Al Qaeda is doomed. They won't have a crack to develop in American politics. I don't imagine that Al Qaeda can fight us for 25 years without completely re-writing their theory and philosophy.

American success may depend on the next Democrat president not being from the Carter Administration mold, as was Clinton on Blackhawk Down.