Economics of War Come to Congressional Budgeting

The Republican Party is the home in America of more astute and insightful economic analysis and the grass roots level. This is growing more and more true as radio talk show hosts become better able to articulate the information. They manage to reduce complex ideas of reducing marginal tax rates creates increased family welfare down to the bumper sticker phrase, “It’s not your money, Senator!”

This same ability to reduce complex ideas down needs to go beyond Economics 101 concepts of guns versus butter or supply and demand. If we do not, we still end up fighting bad Democratic ideas like socialized medicine, spend-now-pay-later social security, etc., on terms that only the Democrats and “all politics is local” pork barrel politicians of both parties can win. Most of this can be accomplished by applying the principles of the dismal science of economics to conflict.


Pork and Islamic Terror
Will any pork barrel politician like being called out as the equivalent of an al-Qaeda terrorist? The politician is more motivated by his single issue pork barrel project than the common good. An al-Qaeda terrorist is more interested in pushing his single issue of Islamicistic domination than the common good of the world’s citizens.

In essays on the economics of war, one professor makes economics and war as much a part of his studies as the pricing of a loaf of bread. There is a demand curve and a supply. The supply is of wealth (i.e., booty or production for war and peace, respectively) versus the demand for conflict.

He claims that his analysis applies equally well for armed conflict or terrorist attacks as for Congressional budget fights. It seems true.

Not being the economist myself, I can only refer to his graphs and analysis for why some of the following points are true. However, common sense and a little observation of human nature bears these “maxims” out.

Because the return on investment is much greater, it is more economically efficient for a small group to push for its single issue than it is for the majority to oppose it. Think about it. A town needs a bridge. They convince their Congressman to get money for the bridge. The Congressman increases his campaign contributions from the townspeople and the benefiting businesses for himself and for his PAC to finance other candidates. He increases his re-election chances by pushing for the bridge. If the bridge is not paid for out of the federal budget, the Congressman gets a lot of good press at home. But if he succeeds in getting the bridge, he might even get his name on it. Then the town will never forget who its benefactor is. (Not much different than Alexandria, Egypt can never forget that it was founded by Alexander the Great nearly 2300 years ago.) If the Congressman has a child who wants to go into politics, the young politician will be able to milk that bridge for votes for generations.

The Congressman on the other side of the country might even vote for this bridge in a town he has never heard of, if he too gets to build something – say, library named after him in his hometown. (The Congressional equivalent of the Carnegie Library – who built those libraries, by the way?)

Now let’s turn to the terrorist. He is motivated to bring down a government. Very few in the community support him. Mao Tse Tung suggested that the terrorist could easily win with a small force. All he needed to do was be highly motivated and smart. So in Mao’s world, you attacked the population that you wished to persuade. As the police and army respond, they respond by repressing the population: restrictions on movement, increased security, reduction of rights to free speech, imposition of higher taxes to pay for more security for the ruler, etc. The population begins to resent the ruler for these impositions. The population begins to fear participating in society for fear of being hurt or killed by terrorist attacks. It is easier for the citizens to stay, not to participate in the economy, and to resent the government. The support for the terrorist grows and feeds into a new cycle of violence.

Both the terrorist and the Congressman feed off of systems that reward the instigator with greater returns than would come from more traditional efforts. Each of these is a highly predictable, economically efficient action for the desired goals.


How to Resolve the Dilemma?
Just because we understand the motivations, does not mean we as average citizens need to approve of that behavior. To overcome either self-centered manipulation of the economics of war, the economist will tell you is dependent on the ethos that permeates the particular society. Why do Republicans and Democrats who dislike each other not fight personal wars through duels, fight factional (see the Federalist Papers for application) wars through armed conflict, or tear apart the Constitution through outright treason and sedition when the minority party in Congress? Simple. The ethos of America does not find such actions acceptable. In Kentucky, the governor must swear at his inauguration that he has never fought a duel. These principled positions survive because the morality of the country requires it not because the law requires it. Law only functions when morality permits it.

Why is Afghanistan war-torn? Because the ethos created by conflict, escalated by the later intervention of the Soviet Union and the U.S.’s support of the opposition, did more to support single issue warlords than it did for civil government. Why is recovery going to be difficult? Warlords still have single issues to promote – themselves. Altruistic behavior and capitalistic commerce will occur in small doses, but only after the courage of the majority to resist warlords through armed conflict becomes strong enough will the warlords disappear.


The Solution of Political Morality
The only way to stop terrorist activity and pork barrel politics is by changing the moral culture that allows it. How? The bumper sticker could say, “Only criminals have pork barrels.” We need to define a moral principle that local funding should be done by states unless many states benefit. The Interstate System benefits all states. If I want to go to Denver from Indianapolis, I am happy to have an interstate through Kansas (even wiser a turnpike, but that is for a different day). If trucks on interstates are not the epitome of interstate commerce, I don’t know interstate commerce.

We need to raise the cost of single issue politics. Only when it is almost more expensive for single issues to win than it is for the majority to oppose will single issues truly die. The politics of theft by Congressional committee needs to be called what it is – criminal. Having worked with groups of people, I know that work only gets done when fewer than two people apply themselves. Groups slow down work. Yet groups are the only way that work can be broadcast. Oh, the paradox!

Controlling lobbying won’t work. Destroying Congressional staffing won’t work. Breaking down doors to executive sessions to committees won’t work.

I am frustrated because I can clearly describe the problem, but I don’t know how to solve for the law of economics in conflict.

In War in the Shadows, the author suggests that guerilla warfare (which terrorist rely on) can only be won by the larger (probably governmental body) group if the larger group abandons the idea that it must seize and hold all territory. The war must be won by establishing fortified areas where the warriors can retreat for recuperation and re-supply among the guerillas. Then the security perimeter can be expanded through cooperative, non-repressive efforts. The population must feel that the government is responsive and protective of the population.

I suggest that this is the way that pork barrel politics at the federal level must be fought. Attorney Greg Garrison has started his own fortified position in Indiana. He is calling out the Congressmen from Indiana on pork barrel politics. Now, I admit that to date most of his examples of pork barrel spending have focused on out-of-state expenditures. For his stronghold to be successful, he must focus on the local population. He needs to identify wasteful spending in Indiana that each Congressman directly benefited from. To attack Pence, the attack must be on spending in Muncie. To attack Carson, the spending must be in Indianapolis. Only when these attacks change the moral culture for voters toward their own Congressmen will the morality truly change.

National attacks on local expenditures is even less effective than local attacks on out-of-state expenditures. Single issue politics is the equivalent of terrorism and its techniques of guerilla warfare. They must be handle the same: so says the law of economics.